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1. Introduction  
The Clean Clothes Campaign (CCC) was launched over 15 years ago. Much has been 
achieved in this period with regard to awareness raising, network building and a growing 
group of transnational corporations that recognise their responsibility for the 
(substandard) working conditions in facilities they do not directly own. At the same time, 
everyone active in the field knows that working conditions in the garment and athletic 
footwear industries have in general not improved. The CCC continues to receive reports 
of worker’s rights violations on an almost daily basis. While code implementation 
programmes have led to some incremental improvements with regard to more visible 
worker’s rights violations, fundamental principles such as the right of workers to be able 
to join a trade union and negotiate collectively with management are not being 
sufficiently addressed. Neither has there been much progress in other areas – for 
example, discrimination and harassment. Wages have generally been stagnant.  
Since the CCC was established to improve the working conditions in the global garment 
industry and empower its workers, we must now ask how we can continue to increase our 
efforts to extend the impact of our campaigns. This paper is part of an ongoing evaluation 
and strategising process through which the CCC’s aims and activities can be accessed, 
reviewed, redefined and adapted. The central question here is what strategies, tools, 
campaigns would help to achieve our objectives?  
In the first section, we will look at the environment we work in, and discuss three closely 
interrelated reasons why the crisis of labour flexibility has acquired structural 
characteristics. The use of structural denotes here that substandard working conditions are 
not isolated or anecdotal accidents but form part of a structured pattern of exploitation 
and abuse. The first concerns the difficulties workers face in organising themselves vis-à-
vis their employers; the second concerns the relocation threat of capital which grants 
corporations much leverage vis-à-vis labour and governments. The third concerns macro-
economic trends (deflation) and micro-economic trends (purchasing practices) that 
further question the sustainability of an export-oriented development strategy. These 
miscellaneous dimensions constitute a real challenge to labour advocates around the 
world. They represent the ‘contextual constraints’ that labour rights activists face as they 
search for solutions. The question then is what kinds of strategies would help to counter 
the structural crisis of labour flexibility?  
 
Section two of the paper will discuss the main anti-sweatshop strategies the CCC and 
international partners have developed since the early 1990s. As an international coalition 
of divers organisations – comprised of consumer organisations, trade unions, researchers, 
human rights groups, migrant solidarity activists, homeworkers and women workers’ 
organisations, world shops, and many other organisations – the CCC has many different 
areas of work and strategies. Obviously, to assess each one of these would be too much 
work and beyond the scope of this paper. We will instead focus on respectively three 
main areas of the CCC’s work: (i) corporate accountability, (ii) urgent appeal work, and 
(iii) large public campaigns. These areas in turn cover numerous levels of action and 
governance and all of them include activities that involves awareness raising, research, 
direct action and networking in various shapes and forms. The work involved in the area 
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of corporate accountability has generated much discussion within and beyond the 
network. This section will briefly discuss how this debate has evolved over the last 15 
years. The CCC’s second major task centres around urgent appeal work. The CCC takes 
up an average of 30 cases per year from many different countries. This section will 
discuss some of the major characteristics and developments in this field. The third major 
area of CCC activity involves organising large public campaigns that target events that 
involve sportswear such as the Olympics and the World and European soccer 
tournaments. These campaigns are particularly important in that they reach out to 
consumers and raise public awareness.  
The final section of the paper discusses three comprehensive counter-strategies that seek 
to address the various dimensions of the structural crisis of labour flexibility and that are 
co-ordinated using various levels of political action and organising. We will discuss three 
strategies that seek to increase the impact and efficiency of anti-sweatshop strategies by 
targeting different scales (local, regional and sector-wide) of action. This section will also 
look at: thematic campaigns (or strategic urgent appeals), the Asian Floor Wage 
Campaign, and the Play Fair Campaign(s) and their attempt(s) to promote a sector-wide 
approach towards the implementation and enforcement of labour rights.  
1.1 A structural crisis of labour flexibility 
The garment and athletic footwear industries are characterised by a structural crisis of 
labour flexibility.1 Barriers to unionisation, the structural power of capital and the 
stubborn adherence to export-led growth all combine to create a structural crisis of labour 
flexibility in the countries at the producing end of the global garment and athletic 
footwear chain. At the core of this structural crisis of labour flexibility lies a functional 
divide in the organisation of production and consumption between sourcing companies 
(brands and retailers), on the one hand, and export-oriented manufacturers, on the other. 
Sourcing companies focus on conceptualising the product (design, research, and 
innovation) and distribution (marketing, advertising), while the labour-intensive 
processes are outsourced. By extricating themselves from material production processes 
and shrinking the workforce, sourcing companies have saved on wage costs and social 
security expenditures. They have transmitted the burden of labour demands from high-
wage organised sectors of the labour market to low-wage and less-organised sectors of 
the labour market. However, the management of mass labour processes becomes 
outsourced to specialists in manufacturing. Increased opportunities to outsource 
production can be understood in these terms, as the driving force behind a transformed 
relationship between the forces of capital and labour. Transnational outsourcing signals 
the increasing power that corporations have to organise and control labour on ever larger 
geographical scales while ignoring the social reproductive needs of labour, or what David 
Harvey calls the ‘social infrastructure that supports life and work’.2  
Outsourcing towards low-wage areas in Asia, Africa, Central America and Eastern 
Europe gives brands and retailers access to so-called dual labour markets, which are 
characterised by the increased division between ‘core’ workers and ‘marginalised’ or 
‘peripheral’ workers. In this type of dual labour market, a company seeks to capitalise the 
use value of a small number of highly qualified labourers like managers, technicians, 
designers, innovators, sometimes called symbolic workers – who conceptualise, oversee, 
manage and reintegrate globally fragmented labourer processes, while the repetitive, 
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monotone or ‘simple tasks’ are treated as ‘abstract’ labour, which can be bought from 
others. Thus, only a small group of ‘core’ workers who are deemed essential to the 
company are kept in-house and given stable contracts, job security and high wages, while 
the labour-intensive aspects of production are performed by a ‘peripheral’ workforce. As 
a result, it is especially the female employees who end up with the insecure, labour-
intensive and low-paying jobs.  
Here we enter the essence of the structural crisis of labour flexibility; namely, a de-
territorialised production system in which sourcing companies do not need to pay 
attention to the reproductive requirements of labour power. This lack of attention is 
symbolised by wages that fail to meet basic needs (housing, energy, nutrition, clothing, 
health care, education, potable water, child care, transportation, and savings), or provide 
additional discretionary income, or take into consideration the number of dependants. It 
makes it possible to exploit labour through short-term contracts, long working hours, 
forced and unpaid overtime, unsafe working conditions, gender discrimination, payment 
tied to unrealistic production targets or piece-rate systems, and redundancy policies that 
offer no or highly inadequate severance pay compensation. In other words, production 
costs are divested – ideally entirely – of reproduction costs. The authoritarian and 
repressive political conditions in which production typically takes place raise various – 
often legal – barriers to the right to organise, and these exacerbate the problem because 
employees are prohibited or restricted from demanding basic workers rights. The next 
section will look at the various barriers that workers face when they seek to organise 
themselves.  
1.2 Barriers to organisation  
The best way to counter poor working conditions, protect basic human rights and decency 
and improve wages is by empowering workers through organisation. Freedom of 
association and collective bargaining are often seen as enabling rights, e.g., they represent 
the ‘key institutional mechanisms to empower workers and thus mitigate power 
asymmetries’. In labour-intensive industries, however, as Spike Peterson has observed: 
‘social reorganisation of the work process (subcontracting, sweatshops, home-work) has 
occurred in ways that isolate workers and prevent collective organisation and its earning 
and status benefits’.3  
There are at least eight reasons why this is difficult to achieve in the garment and athletic 
footwear industries, as well as in many other globalised industries (electronics, toys, etc.).  
a. The repression of political rights and trade unions in important production countries 
like China or Vietnam undermines the workers’ capacity to freely organise. For 
instance, many of the Chinese workplace unions in foreign invested factories are 
actually set up by management without democratic elections. The workers are often 
even unaware of the trade unions’ existence. In other countries, unionisation is either 
banned in export processing zones or made nearly impossible through legal limitations 
and restrictions on union recognition.4 In addition, even in countries where trade 
unions are recognised, enforcement is often weak, while bureaucratic delays and legal 
manoeuvres make it difficult for unions to register and claim their rights. 
  
 7
b. Employers often use acts of discrimination against union members or workers 
suspected of engaging in organising activity. This can range from promotion denial to 
intimidation or outright violence. For example, a union leader in an Indonesian factory 
supplying Lotto was demoted from is position as a supervisor to a janitor/security 
guard. He was also placed on a night shift.5 But this kind of practise easily spirals into 
more intimidating methods to stop labour’s organising efforts. For example, 
sometimes workers are actually locked out of the factory or are directly confronted 
with violence. Over the years, thousands of workers have been fired for joining 
unions, which in turn sends a strong discouraging message to non-unionised workers.  
 
c. Garment and footwear factories are located in areas with large labour pools, while the 
skill level required has generally been low. The existence of a ‘reserve army’ of labour 
to draw from can be used to discipline individual workers, or the shifting of 
manufacturing facilities in reaction to collective workers actions. In addition, the 
redundancy of workers can also be used to cut wage costs and intensify the work level. 
Lack of alternative employment means that many workers think twice about risking 
their jobs. 
 
d. Barriers to the right to organise are not just legal or political but also involve a lack of 
resources, such as an informed workforce, time, money, or a local management who 
understand the importance of the freedom of association and collective bargaining. 
Many of the workers migrated to the factories from rural areas. They are new to 
industrial labour and are often unaware of their rights and have no or little organising 
experience.  
 
e. Male chauvinism and unequal gender relations create further barriers for labour 
organising. It is estimated that some 80 per cent of the 50 million workers employed in 
the export processing zones are women.6 Young women (or teenage girls) are often 
recruited because employers consider them ‘docile, tireless, and naturally suited to 
perform repetitive work with her hands’.7  Of course, this is a myth. Women workers 
are not only the first to assume the assembly line jobs in the export processing zones, 
but are also the first to lose their jobs when a production facility abandons a region or 
country. This dynamic places women workers ‘at the heart of the story of both 
industrialisation and deindustrialisation’.8 At the same time, women employees who 
work long hours in factories and then have to go home to assume their household 
responsibilities involving reproductive and domestic care are unlikely to become 
involved in trade union activity.  
 
f. The almost all-female workforce is in direct contrast with the almost all-male union 
leadership. To encourage female workers to form and join organisations of their own 
choosing requires that female workers can readily identify with their leadership. Jasna 
Petrovic, who works for the International Trade Union Confederation (ITUC), puts it 
thusly:  
 
The majority of union leaders still do not understand that unions need women as much as 
women need unions. Many trade unions still do not realise promoting gender-related 
policies and launching campaigns for organising women workers in both the formal and 
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informal sectors should have priority, maybe are even the survival issue for trade unions 
as trade unions led only and exclusively by men are not going to survive.9 
g. The way production is fragmented among many production sites and countries also 
makes it difficult to achieve collective organisation. Sourcing companies spread 
production over dozens of countries and (often) hundreds of suppliers.10 This divide-
and-rule strategy reduces labour’s bargaining power and makes it possible to exploit 
the locational rigidity of workforces. And while differences between workers on the 
basis of skill, gender, ethnicity, or position (i.e., ‘core’ workers versus ‘peripheral’ 
workers) have always posed problems for collective action efforts, the spatial 
decentralisation of production further intensifies these differences but also adds new 
problems, for example, related to distance, language, tradition or nationality, for 
everyone seeking to establish and extend solidarity links based on the workers’ 
similarities. 
  
h. The precarious (‘flexible’) nature of employment already makes organising very 
difficult. Workers who have temporary or seasonal contracts (irregular workers) are 
never certain that their contracts will be renewed. For instance, the union 
representatives at an Indonesian factory that produces for the sportswear brands Puma 
and Umbro, who have been campaigning for the rights of temporary workers, pointed 
out that:  
 
The unfair system of employing workers on temporary contracts should be abolished. All 
workers at [our factory] should be permanent workers. Temporary workers at [our 
factory] are often fired, their jobs are [the] most insecure. They have to then find another 
job themselves and they do not receive any severance pay. Once a month, when the 
management holds meetings, a couple of contract workers wind up getting fired11 
  
In addition to workers with irregular contracts, many have no contract at all. They 
work in non-registered workplaces and are often home-based. Without a legal 
employment relationship, these workers face even more obstacles in organising, while 
their informal status makes it difficult if not impossible to apply national labour 
legislation that requires employers to recognise and bargain with labour 
organisations.12 The causalisation of work often extends into workplaces that operate 
on a formal basis, for example, by hiring workers without a formal contract.13 This 
further undermines the development of effective industrial relations.  
The cumulative effect of these factors comprises the first set of reasons why the crisis of 
labour flexibility has acquired a structural character. The many difficulties workers face 
in organising further widens the gap between the scale of global production chains and 
local and national worker organisations, while the growing disparity of power between 
unions and international (de facto) employers cannot be analysed without taking into 
account the issues of the relocation threat, deregulation, and neo-liberalism.  
1.3 The relocation threat 
Even though barriers to organisation often seem local in nature, we must analyse these 
barriers in the context of global production. The emergence of the global supply chain 
has altered the balance of power between employers and unions and weakened traditional 
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regulatory mechanisms associated with the state. International outsourcing has detached 
corporations from the specific communities and specific labour pools associated with 
them.14  
By externalising the labour-intensive aspects of production, sourcing companies no 
longer have to take responsibility for the majority of workers involved in the process. In 
this context, workers are increasingly treated as a ‘subcontracted component’ rather than 
a fixture as part of employer organisations. It has offered a particular category of 
companies – brands and retailers – an opportunity to break out of the highly unionised 
and established industrial areas with strict institutionalised labour processes. As a result, 
corporations can pit workers in different localities and different geographical jurisdictions 
against one another. By contrast, labour is much more locked into a particular place. This 
offers corporations the option of picking and choosing a favourable location, often 
referred to as ‘regime shopping’ or the ‘race to the bottom’.  
The ability to relocate production is an example of the ‘structural power’ uniquely 
available to corporations.15 Which means that even if (against all odds) labour succeeds 
in building up collective power, and even if the export-led growth strategy of a range of 
countries who have put all their eggs in this basket is sustained (against all expectations), 
workers and governments will still have to face the threat of capital relocation. This is the 
second reason why the crisis of labour flexibility has acquired a structural quality.  
This structural power is expressed when the purchasing departments of branded 
corporations decide not to source from unionised factories or when they massively place 
orders from countries where worker rights are systematically repressed. The ability to 
provide material rewards or to impose sanctions towards those labour regimes it favours 
or disfavours sends a clear message to governments, corporations and workers. Any 
strategy to improve working conditions on a national scale will have to take into account 
what the consequences will be for capital flows into that country. As a continued threat, 
the possibility of relocation increasingly becomes anticipated by the actions that the 
workers and governments take as an aspect of the discourse of what will happen to 
‘industry’, ‘exports’ or ‘employment’ if they  don’t adjust to the imperatives of global 
competitiveness.16 As a result, ‘global market discipline’, as Ankie Hoogvelt has argued, 
is increasingly ‘internalised inside the behaviour of economic agents…’17 
Asian TNCs 
This picture is further complicated by the emergence of an East Asian fraction of capital 
that specialises in the organisation of predominantly export-orientated, low-skill, low-
wage, labour-intensive, and high-volume manufacturing across a range of industries. 
Instead of being the ‘prisoners of the OEM sourcers’, these companies have turned the 
tapping of the world’s reservoirs of cheap labour supplies into a highly profitable 
activity.18 Departing from the vantage point of production, these companies have become 
focused on producing either high quality components or finished products often for 
several (competing) brand-named corporations of either Western or Japanese origin. This 
is especially true for companies from Taiwan, South Korea and Hong Kong that have 
successfully upgraded themselves into first-class original equipment manufacturers but 
relocated the majority of their operations off-shore. Their organisational capacity turned 
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out to be crucial in the spatial re-organisation of sourcing networks that ‘flexibly connect 
the developed core and underdeveloped periphery together’.19  
Asian TNCs play a particular role in ‘mediating commercial capital from the West and 
workers in Asia’, as Dae-oup Chang of Asia Monitor Resource Centre (AMRC) has 
described it.20 It is especially this capital fraction that organises, manages, disciplines and 
exploits the insertion of the world’s new workers into factories. Indeed, with both nodes 
of the capital circuit controlled by foreign firms, the contribution of garment and 
footwear exporting countries is limited to low-priced ‘hands’ with no or very few rights. 
The increased hegemony of the TNCs calls into question some of the presumed power 
dynamics within the global supply chains of sportswear where sourcing corporations are 
often the most powerful players who are ultimately able to dictate terms to the presumed 
captive suppliers.21  
The main reasons why they have relocated to these countries are the low wages paid to 
workers for assembly and the favourable conditions for foreign investors such as low 
taxes. Hence, the trickle-down effects on the local economy are minimal as most of the 
profits go to foreign companies.22 The Taiwanese scholar, Lu-Chin Cheng, who has 
researched footwear industry restructuring, concludes that triangle manufacturing 
confines production sites to an ‘implanted enclave economy with very [little] chance for 
the host economy to participate beyond cheap labour supply’.23 Indeed, with both nodes 
of the capital circuit controlled by foreign firms, the contribution of garment and 
footwear exporting countries is limited to lowly priced ‘hands’ with no or very few 
rights.  
Thus, even if workers succeed in building up a considerable amount of counter-pressure 
to defend their rights, and this is translated into higher wages, both Asian TNCs and 
global sourcing companies will (threaten to) move their operations to the next export 
processing zone located in some other country. These kinds of factory closures send a 
strong warning to workers in neighbouring factories: do not organise if you want to keep 
your jobs. This dynamic makes organising even more difficult for trade unions. After all, 
if worker organisations cannot succeed in their objectives – better working conditions and 
higher wages – through political struggle and collective bargaining, it becomes less 
attractive for workers to join them in the first place. The constant threat of relocation 
makes it difficult to design successful counter-strategies at a national level.  
This happened when workers in Indonesia gained the right to freedom of organisation 
and large-scale worker protests broke out after the fall of the Suharto regime at the end of 
the 1990s. Employers warned the government that ‘some foreign shoe producers in 
Indonesia ... have intentions to relocate their factories to other developing countries such 
as Vietnam, which offers a more favourable investment climate.’24 According to the 
National Labour Force Survey, over 180,000 workers (58.70 per cent of the total) lost 
their jobs in the Indonesian footwear industry in 2003. De facto deindustrialisation has 
forced many workers to return to traditional agriculture.25 ‘Indonesia is now under 
China’s shadow’, Tsutomu Nakagawa, chairman of the Japanese Chamber of Commerce 
and Industry argued, ‘it is no longer a competitor to China. Indonesia needs to think 
about its total industrial policy if it wants to compete in the global market and not just 
focus on small items’.26 
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Only a few years later, a similar message was sent to the Vietnamese government when 
Vietnamese workers walked out of their factories on a massive scale to demand higher 
minimum wages. The European Chamber of Commerce in Vietnam immediately wrote a 
letter to Prime Minister Phan Van Khai saying that they were worried that the strikes 
could spread to European-owned companies. The letter also pointed out that investors set 
up shop in Vietnam precisely because ‘the workforce is not prone to industrial action’. 
The most important investors, the Taiwanese were also quick to warn the Vietnamese 
government that the strikes needed to be dealt with properly and quickly, or it would have 
an adverse impact on Taiwanese investment in Vietnam.27  
Of course, much of these verbal relocation pressures are rhetorical and strategic. Even 
labour-intensive industries like footwear, toys and garments cannot be relocated 
overnight – at least not on a country-wide scale. However, individual factories often do 
close overnight. Furthermore, in the case of Vietnam or China it would be difficult to find 
a country where the productions costs, including labour costs, were cheaper. Yet the 
message is very clear and often effective: workers, producers and governments must 
conform to international standards of price and quality, or face the risk of disinvestment 
and relocation.  
Neo-liberalism 
At the same time, deregulation and neo-liberal policies have urged many governments to 
restructure the labour sector to suppress trade union activity and promote flexible labour. 
While legal rights and protections for corporations have been dramatically extended and 
increasingly institutionalised through the World Trade Organisation (WTO), regional 
and/or bilateral trade agreements, workers’ rights throughout the world have been 
thoroughly eroded. This erosion has undermined the social buffers that formerly sought 
to protect workers from the world economy. It has resulted in the flexibilisation, 
causalisation and feminisation of labour processes. For neo-liberals, trade unions, labour 
laws and state regulation are nothing but impediments to the labour market’s – 
supposedly – efficient allocation mechanism. In practice, this meant that many states 
have abolished trade-based labour unions and pushed the creation of company- (or 
enterprise-) based unions. A move, as one World Bank report writes, ‘reduced the 
marginal benefit and increased the marginal cost of collective action’.28 Workers from 
these countries, the writers continue, ‘were more likely to refrain from work stoppages 
and other disruptions and from lobbying the government for mandated wage increases’.29  
Thus, to conclude this section, the context of deregulation, neo-liberalism and capital’s 
capacity to operate across different scales through relocation strategies, further add to the 
structural crisis of labour. This in turn is closely related to the third set of practices, 
namely the limits of an export-led growth strategy, deflation and sourcing practices that 
contradict ethical standards. 
1.4 Deflation and purchasing practices  
Finally, the structural crisis is also determined by both macro-economic and micro-
economic dynamics which makes it difficult to achieve structural improvements for 
workers and their organisations.  
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a. Macro-economic trends: Deflation 
On a macro-economic level, as long as the exports of developing countries goes 
predominantly to circa 30 developed countries, two dangerous developments emerge. 
First, given that most non-labour production costs are stable and more or less equal 
among the various industrialising countries, the flexible costs (i.e., labour) will remain 
under a downward pressure.30 The integration of the world economy might therefore be 
accompanied by a growing international disparity in wages, labour costs and labour 
standards, which is often referred to as the ‘race to the bottom’. As exemplified in the 
stagnant or falling wages in several key garment exporting countries.   
Secondly, and related, this gloomy prospect is further intensified by the increasing excess 
of production capacity. As a result, world prices for industrial (especially standardised) 
goods in many countries have come under serious price pressure, which is similar to the 
trend in agricultural commodities a few decades earlier. This means that profits can only 
be maintained by cutting costs. Falling export prices triggered by growing industrial 
output at the labour-intensive end of the chain, might result in increased levels of exports 
through lower wages, and/or export prices that fall faster than volumes increase.31 With 
Chinese factory prices still falling and with mainland China (as a whole) assuming an 
ever-larger share of the world’s industrial exports (due to the enormous in-flows of 
foreign capital and a seemingly endless supply of cheap labour) world prices for 
manufactured commodities can be expected to remain under (deflationary) pressures on 
into the foreseeable future.  
The UNCTAD has calculated that in the period between 1980 and 1996, the prices of 
industrial commodities produced in the South decreased by 18 per cent.32 This trend did 
not stop here, so that in the period 1996 to 2004, price indices for clothing and shoes had 
declined another 10%.33 This trend is particularly important in garment production, 
because, in the U.S., retail garments have, in fact, lagged inflation since 1982.34 
Kaplinsky and Morris have noted that, especially ‘since China’s entry into global markets 
in the mid-1980s, we have begun to witness a historically significant decline in terms of 
trade of developing countries’ manufacturing exports’. Logically, if the growth in 
domestic demand slows down, overproduction and deflation will follow at some point. 
This makes ‘countries specialising in labour-intensive manufactured exports … 
[particularly] vulnerable to misplaced insertion in global markets.’ The phasing out of the 
multi-fibre agreement in 2005 has further increased competition among garment 
exporting countries, leading to a consolidation of garment production in Asia.  
The transnational fragmentation of production has turned wages into an international cost 
of production instead of a local source of demand. The organisational split between 
global-sourcing companies and export-oriented manufacturers has undermined the 
(Fordist and Keynesian) link between ‘labour cost in the production sphere and consumer 
purchasing power in the market sphere’.35 Unlike the Fordist system and its negotiated 
wage agreements on a national level, the current system has no interest or incentive to 
promote collective wage increases.  
b. Micro-economic trends and purchasing practices  
Macro-economic trends are the aggregates of the micro-economic practices of individual 
companies. Everything else being equal, falling prices at the points of consumption put 
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profit rates under pressure. While brands and retailers can use different strategies to 
counter declining profits, for example, by winning market shares through marketing or 
brand-name strategies, using more productive technologies, or by entering new markets, 
one popular avenue for restoring profits in labour-intensive industries has been based on 
reducing sourcing costs, and particularly wages.36  
Low-cost sourcing has been pursued most radically by large retailers like Wal-Mart and 
Aldi that have done rather well with the implementation of these practises. In 1993, there 
was not a single retail firm on the list of the world’s top 100 TNCs; one decade later, 
however, the list included 14 companies.37 The world’s largest multi-product retailer, 
Wal-Mart, plays a particularly important role because its strategy is based on ‘always low 
pricing’ which is achieved through an ‘Every Day Low Pricing’ (EDLP) strategy based 
on Rollbacks and ‘Every Day Low Cost’ (EDLC). Their enormous size affords them a 
tremendous amount of purchasing power over suppliers which they apply toward low-
cost sourcing. This in turn allows them to drive prices down at the retail level – by 
offering jeans for four dollars, etc. – and this, in turn, allows them to win market share 
from competitors, who are forced to pursue a similar low-cost sourcing strategy (or get 
out of the business). We can summarise this dynamic as the ‘survival of the cheapest’.  
In this context, therefore, purchasing practices refer to the way brand-named 
corporations, retailers and agents organise how they purchase their products from 
manufacturers (or suppliers/ vendors). Purchasing practices that contribute to, or further 
deteriorate, poor working conditions are often associated with unstable relationships with 
the manufacturers, widely fluctuating orders, demanding shorter lead times, and price-
setting policies. Many of these practices are designed to transfer the risks to the 
supplier.38 While this sourcing model grants buyers a lot of flexibility, it leaves suppliers 
with little or no incentive to invest in their workforce, to increase productivity, or change 
their ‘sweatshop’ business strategies that are predicated on poor working conditions.39  
Another important player in shaping purchasing practices are buying agents, who act as 
intermediaries between manufacturers (suppliers) and brands or retailers (sourcing 
companies). This is where Li & Fung play a particularly important role. As the world’s 
largest independent buying agency, sourcing US$10 billion worth of goods in over 40 
countries in 2006, Li & Fung organises the sourcing practices for a large group of mainly 
Western-based branded and retail companies. In 2006, the company announced a deal in 
which it would handle all of the global imports for KarstadtQuelle. In a press release, 
KardstadtQuelle argues that this deal is expected to result in ‘significant savings’ and a 
‘reduction of purchase prices of up to 10%’.40 Other advantages mentioned include 
‘greater flexibility in procurement processes’ and ‘considerable extension of terms of 
payment (payment conditions)’.41 It is not hard to imagine how these savings will get in 
the way of the suppliers’ ability to comply with basic working conditions.  
To conclude section one… 
So far we have presented the parameters of why it is possible to argue that garment and 
athletic footwear production is characterised by a structural crisis of labour flexibility. 
These industries exemplify how the international dispersion of production has led to a 
disruption of national economies, and the power of labour in that context. It has increased 
the discipline of capital, and led to a deterioration in labour conditions on a world scale. 
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Production is dispersed across different sites for ‘cheaper’ and more flexible labour. 
Women workers at these assembly lines face insecurity, repression, dangerous working 
conditions and physical, verbal and sexual harassment, while their labour power is 
devalued to a level insufficient to meet basic needs or to sustain a family. At the same 
time, workers have very few collective mechanisms at their disposal to protect 
themselves against management abuse and poverty wages. The repressive legal, social, 
and political circumstances in which production generally takes place means that 
collective bargaining rights can not be exercised by workers. But even if workers succeed 
in organising themselves and want to enter into collective bargaining, they discover that 
they are bargaining with the wrong people, namely local capital itself subordinated to the 
dynamics of global capitalism.  
 
We have not looked at how the socially disruptive practices of neo-liberalism have 
evoked a counter-reaction from a broad global movement of labour advocates, activists, 
consumers, and workers themselves, which has led not only to mass protests against the 
WTO, IMF and World Bank, but has also stimulated the global anti-sweatshop 
campaign(s) that targets large corporations like those that dominate the garment and 
sportswear industries. These countervailing tendencies have turned the garment and 
athletic footwear industry into a terrain of sector-specific social and ideological conflicts. 
These tendencies may ultimately increase accountability up the global chain and improve 
the prospects of viable collective bargaining structures. These topics will be discussed in 
the following sections.   
2. Three main areas of Clean Clothes Campaign activity 
Substandard labour conditions and extreme forms of exploitation in the athletic footwear 
industry became a public issue in the early 1990s when anti-sweatshop groups started to 
target branded corporations over labour conditions in the factories that produced their 
wares. Large multinationals like Nike, the Gap or H&M, and occasionally, smaller brand-
name corporations became the targets of these campaigns, which gained momentum over 
the course of the next decade. The major objective of these transnationally organised 
campaign networks was to improve working conditions and, ‘to bring back to the TNC 
level some responsibility for workers no matter in whose employment they are or in what 
part of the world they live’.42 Since its establishment in the early 1990s, the Clean 
Clothes Campaign (CCC) has worked from a workers’ perspective with the aim to 
improve working conditions and to empower workers in the global garment industry. 
(For a short history of the campaign, see box 1).43  
 
Box 1. Short History of the Clean Clothes Campaign 1989-2006   
1989: The beginning 
In 1989, solidarity and women’s organisations in the Netherlands and UK took up the case of a 
garment factory lockout in the Philippines. Women at this William Baird (UK) and C&A (NL) 
subcontractor were fired for demanding their legal minimum wage. During the year the workers 
picketed, while groups in the Netherlands and UK continued campaigning; stories about women 
workers’ rights and TNC responsibility attracted media attention; research revealed similar cases in 
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Bangladesh, India and Western Europe, and more organisations got involved. the campaign for 
‘clean clothes’ had effectively been launched, and it took up the demands of Southern women’s 
groups and labour organisations.   
1990 to 1995: Agenda setting and visibility  
The main aim was to give a face and a voice to the women in developing countries that were being 
integrated into the global economy through what was then called the ‘new international division of 
labour’. International supply chains and the ‘regulation gap’ became a pressing issue. In the global 
South, civil society lacked capacity, governments lacked the political will and workers, often 
migrant, young and female, were in a weak position. The CCC exposed this reality through a series 
of creative actions and media-directed efforts, started an English language newsletter, expanded its 
contacts in the South and by 1995, unions and NGOs had agreed to form ‘clean clothes’ coalitions 
in the UK, Belgium, Germany and France. A meeting of organisations from six Asian countries 
marked the first global CCC meeting in Brussels, where a common agenda for action was 
developed.  
1996-2001: Corporate responsibility and workers’ voice 
Believing ‘to oppose one must propose’, CCC developed a model code of conduct, supported by 
the international trade union movement, Asian organisations and over 200 European NGOs and 
unions. Companies that signed on to this proposal, which included the formation of an independent 
monitoring body, were invited to start pilot projects. Meanwhile, the network grew rapidly: by 
1999, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland and Austria had joined the CCC, contacts had been made in 
Central America, the Caribbean and Eastern Europe and the Asian network expanded into virtually 
all of the Asian garment producing countries. The urgent appeal (UA) system was set up and 
public campaigns on wages and worker education commenced. The CCC pursued CSR debates, 
actively participating in the formation of various so-called multi-stakeholder initiatives to oversee 
code implementation. In 2001, a global CCC meeting brought together 88 representatives of NGOs 
and unions from 30 countries to evaluate past work and draft a five-year agenda for action. 
2002-2006: The Right to Organise – The Right to Know 
The CCC expanded and carried out an impact assessment of its UA mechanism and developed and 
documented a more explicit gender analysis of labour rights issues. Moving ‘from code to 
compliance’ CCC focused on establishing standards and tools for code implementation and 
genuine workplace improvements: complaints mechanisms, worker education and training 
programmes, participatory auditing and improved transparency, and most importantly striving for 
freedom of association. The network was strengthened, primarily in Southern Africa, Eastern 
Europe and the Middle East. In 2004, the CCC worked with Oxfam International and global unions 
on the biggest international anti-sweatshop campaigns ever to address systemic violations of 
workers’ rights, specifically regarding the FOA, in the sportswear industry.  
 
Today (2008), the CCC consists of 12 national coalitions in 11 European countries, each with its 
own secretariat. The partner network is strongest in Asia; followed by Southern Africa, Eastern 
Europe and Central America. National coalitions and partners are responsible for securing their 
own funding. The CCC is not a donor organisation; it considers this function as being at odds with 
the managing and facilitating of a global grassroots network. 
 
As a network operating in the spaces of consumption, the CCC seeks to harness the 
power of consumers to push for positive social change. Success or failure to exert 
pressure on brand-named and retail corporations to except responsibility and to change 
practices ultimately depends on our capacity to inform, engage, persuade and mobilise 
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citizens to use their power as consumers in the various activities the CCC employs. The 
CCC coalitions in each European country inform consumers about the practices of the 
specific brands that dominate the market in their own countries. Information on working 
conditions in the garment industry is distributed via newsletters, the Internet, and in the 
form of research publications. Moreover, public actions, rallies and demonstrations 
encourage consumers to pursue a variety of ways to take action to improve conditions. 
Anti-sweatshop campaigns aim at ‘…reestablishing the link, blurred by global 
outsourcing, between brands and retailers in the North and workers in supplier factories 
in the South’.44 As Edna Bonacich and Richard Appelbaum note: ‘globalisation  enables  
manufacturers  to  shift  their  production  sites  to  avoid militant  workers,  but  they  
cannot  so  easily  avoid  militant consumers’.45 It is important, however, to emphasise 
that the CCC does not focus exclusively on corporations, but is also exploring legal 
initiatives for improving working conditions, for example, by lobbying for legislation to 
promote good working conditions and ratification of ILO standards. In addition, the CCC 
has also targeted governments – city councils, national governments – to compel them to 
ethically procure the goods they consume, for example, particularly in the case of the 
uniforms policemen and firemen wear.46 
 
In the next section, we will discuss the 
three major areas of CCC operations 
that, at least ideally, would reinforce 
each other. This concerns activities 
involving corporate accountability, 
urgent appeals and global campaigns 
(see figure 1).  
 
2.1 Corporate accountability47 
Codes of conduct and activities to make corporations more accountable are important 
aspects of the CCC’s work. It is important, however, to emphasise that the CCC’s 
understanding is that codes of conduct may serve various interests and agendas, ‘catering 
to both reformist and conservative interests’.48 The proliferation of codes of conduct is 
therefore driven by a wide range of stakeholders, which have different interests and 
contrasting expectations of the purpose of these instruments.49 Hence, it is crucial to 
understand the context, the history and the political processes associated with the 
emergence and development of these voluntary initiatives. These instruments can 
therefore best be understood as objects of political contestation and strategic framing 
between different social forces searching for ways to fill the regulatory vacuum.50 We can 
distinguish between four phases of political contestation through which the code of 
conduct debate has developed since the early 1990s. Each phase also demarcates a terrain 
of struggle which is absorbed into a broader field in the subsequent phase.  
 
a. Making Companies Accept Responsibility  
The first area of political contestation has been centred on making companies accept that 
they can be held responsible for working conditions in entities that they do not own. 
When retailers like Carrefour or C&A and branded companies such as Nike or Adidas 
Figure 1.  
Corporate 
accountability 
Urgent 
Appeals
Global 
Campaigns
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were first confronted with allegations of sourcing from factories with substandard 
working conditions in the early 1990s, they tended to reject the assumption that they were 
in any way associated with the circumstances in which their commodities were produced. 
Very few companies today maintain the principals of this earlier position.  
 
b. The Struggle on International Labour Standards 
The second phase of political contestation included making companies or business 
associations – which also started to adopt codes of conduct – accept internationally 
recognised labour standards as set by the International Labour Organisation (ILO). Many 
corporate codes are criticised for representing weak principles or vaguely defined 
guidelines. Code requirements often only focus on those issues that are considered the 
most sensitive to public outcry such as child labour or forced labour. In other instances, 
they are defined in such general terms that they amount to ‘useless as instruments that 
would uphold or advance workers’ rights’.51 The CCC and others reacted to these weak 
codes by adopting ‘model codes’, the purpose of which was to set standards for 
standards, i.e., minimum levels that the codes themselves should reach. For the CCC, the 
model-code drafted in 1997 made it possible for European and Asian labour advocates to 
speak with one voice to the companies, granting them a benchmark against which 
corporate codes could be measured. Since the code was signed by international trade 
union organisations, several Asian organisations and networks (from Indonesia, Sri 
Lanka, Bangladesh, Hong Kong) and all of the approximately 250 NGOs and trade 
unions in the European CCC coalitions, the code has gained much moral authority in the 
field of (private/non-state) labour regulation. For campaigning objectives, the CCC model 
code turned out to be useful as a point of reference to push corporations into accepting 
higher standards, or as a way to create public debate. The debates have, however, 
continued to crystallise around issues such as freedom of association, wages (minimum 
vs. living wage), and the scope of ‘non-discrimination clauses’, and remediation.52  
 
c. Implementation, monitoring and verification  
No matter how stringent the criteria of a code are, they remain symbolic instruments for 
improving workplace conditions as long as they lack a programme to go from paper to 
practice. Activists soon challenged companies to demonstrate conformity to the standards 
they had adopted. A third moment of political contestation has, therefore, centred around 
the question of what would constitute an adequate way of implementing, monitoring and 
verifying compliance with codes of conduct.53 Implementation refers here to the range of 
concrete measures that a company carries out to give effect to a code.54 Internal 
monitoring or company monitoring refers to the procedures and practices a company 
carries out in order to ensure that labour standards have been implemented and are 
continuously observed in the workplace.55 Finally, verification is to establish the 
credibility of claims concerning actual labour practices, the observance of code 
provisions, or the observance of code implementation. In other words, credible 
verification would require rule-based systems that cover the selection and training of 
auditors as well as inspection techniques, etc. This at least implies that verification is 
carried out by a body that is independent of the entity whose claim is being verified.56  
These kinds of criticism have brought into the open the need for an overarching system 
for evaluating company claims and to raise the bar of corporate self-regulation. It has 
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stimulated the creation of a number of so-called multi-stakeholder initiatives (MSIs), 
which involve a variety of business interests, NGOs and/or trade unions trying to develop 
(more) systematic approaches to code implementation, monitoring and verification, as 
well as developing structures for accountability to civil society (see box 2.). These MSIs 
have created a space where NGOs and trade unions have a voice in furthering the 
development of regulatory initiatives. They embody new forms of social dialogue where 
different stakeholders regularly meet, exchange views or devise joint projects.57 The 
credibility of these initiatives is further enhanced by moving the debate from corporate 
self-regulation to co-regulation,.  
It must be noted that the debate today is less focussed on how to establish a body that 
(independently) verifies corporate claims on ethical standards. Instead, there is a growing 
recognition that a multi-stakeholder process is necessary to address systemic worker 
rights problems. This process may still include monitoring/verification activities but also 
– and probably more important – more specific co-designed multi-stakeholder 
programmes concerning complaints procedures, transparency, worker training, 
purchasing practices, living wages, and industry-specific as well as country-specific 
barriers in establishing decent working conditions. This would include, for example, 
independent worker representation in China and Vietnam, severance pay in Indonesia, 
wages in Bangladesh, etc. These (and other) issues cannot be credibly addressed by 
business or business-dominated initiatives.  
 
Box 2. Multi-stakeholder initiatives 
In the apparel and (athletic) footwear industries the most important MSIs are: Fair labor 
Association (FLA); Workers Rights Consortium (WRC); Ethical Trading Initiative (ETI); Social 
Accountability International (SAI); and Fair Wear Foundation (FWF). These initiatives have the 
following in common. They:  
• bring a wider range of actors into decision-making procedures 
• agree upon a standardised code of conduct generally informed by ILO standards 
• concur with follow-up activities designed to put labour standards into effect 
 
To  varying degrees they might also:  
• use social audits as a mechanism for monitoring/verifying codes of conduct  
• authorise or accredit organisations to conduct the verification process  
• certify workplaces or branded companies  
• promote social dialogue and learning between different stakeholders  
• facilitate the processing of complaints from workers, trade unions or NGOs as part of the 
monitoring/verification process  
• stimulate stakeholder participation in code verification at points of production 
• get financial or facilitative support from governments. 
 
Source: Merk 2007. 
 
d. Workers’ participation  
Multi-stakeholder initiatives succeeded in placing the topic of implementation, 
monitoring and verification high on the code of conduct agenda. They address some of 
the weaknesses associated with corporate-led attempts, particularly by recognising the 
 19
core ILO conventions. In addition, they have opened up space for participation and social 
dialogue between different stakeholders on an international level. Nonetheless, many 
within the corporate accountability movement have remained critical of the ability to 
realise these standards on the ground, e.g., the real impact these standards have in the 
factories and workplaces around the world. While workers are often the stated 
beneficiaries of code implementation and monitoring programmes, their influence on 
those programmes is marginal (at best). ‘Without their active participation, codes of 
conduct run the danger of becoming tools for corporate interests rather than workers’ 
interests’, as Rainer Braun and Judy Gearhart have pointed out.58 This is a serious 
problem in light of the increasing number of self-assigned experts (law firms, 
accountancy, consultants, ethics officers, etc.) who have jumped onto the CSR 
bandwagon in order to extract ‘business’ out of it. Activists and critical scholars worry 
that this has helped to ‘domesticate the CSR space as a docile, auditable, and 
management friendly arena that is inhabited by professionals’, as Ngai-Ling Sum puts 
it.59 By appropriating these topics, these professionals seek to turn workers into passive 
objects to be audited, instead of active subjects that need to be involved in the regulation 
of their own working conditions. This ‘economising [of] the ethical’ might result in a 
domestication of social responsibility through management techniques.60  
The CCC has argued that too much focus on social audits distracts attention from other 
activities that labour rights advocates believe are crucial to ensuring code 
implementation, such as complaints mechanisms, reporting, worker training and 
education, and changes in purchasing practices.61 Hence, the main question is how to 
encourage labour self-organising at sites of production and/or to connect with traditional 
workers’ struggles in today’s decentralised, globalised context. The promotion of worker 
self-organisation and participation within (and beyond) these code monitoring and 
verification systems has become a fourth area of political contestation. Only after 
workers understand their rights, are able to organise themselves, and to defend their own 
interest, real, sustainable change is likely to occur.  
2.2 Urgent appeals 
While the campaign for corporate accountability articulates the demands for structural 
improvements, pressure on companies to take action on individual instances of labour 
rights violations is exercised through the CCC’s urgent appeals system.62 Urgent appeals 
are requests for action on violations of workers rights that the CCC receives, verifies, and 
disseminates. This includes calls for solidarity from garment workers and their 
representatives who are persecuted, discriminated against, or have lost their jobs because 
they have tried to organise to improve the conditions in which they work. The demands 
the CCC publicises and pursues are those made by the workers themselves – they take the 
risks in terms of safety and loss of jobs. Therefore, it is the workers themselves who 
should set the strategy and make the decisions about if and how their cases are presented 
to the sourcing companies involved, as well as the public, and the media. Although 
sourcing companies represent the main target of these campaigns, urgent appeals have 
also been directed at factory owners, ministers, governors, embassies, EPZ authorities, 
World Bank and so on. In addition, these campaigns span multiple scales and sites. For 
Southern organisations the fact that the CCC operates as an umbrella network, working 
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together with many organisations throughout Europe is also seen as a strength ‘by 
contacting one organisation you contact many’.63 
Since its establishment in the early 1990s, the CCC has worked on hundreds of appeals 
(see table 1). The majority of the appeals concern violations of core ILO convention 
number 87 on freedom of association and the right to organise and number 98 on 
collective bargaining. This includes violations concerning repression, discrimination, 
harassment and violence against union members, dismissal due to union activities, 
denying workers the right to form a trade union and collectively bargain an agreement.64 
Most urgent appeals are co-ordinated by the International Secretariat of the CCC, but 
sometimes appeals go directly to a specific CCC which has links with the 
organisation/union in the producer country. When the CCC receives a request for actions 
of solidarity, several criteria play a role in the selection of cases: is there a connection to 
one of the European countries in which the CCC is located (brand is headquartered or 
sold there, or other reasons why a particular national CCC would be interested in taking 
up the case. If the CCC can not accept the case (because the corporation is not 
headquartered in Europe, it will try to engage other organisations in the US, Australia or 
Canada.  
The level of work that is done on each of these cases varies significantly,65 and can range 
from writing and distributing a few letters to full-scale campaigns that include a range of 
tactics (demonstrations, picket lines, worker tours, etc.). In contrast, other urgent appeals 
have no public campaigning component and never enter the public arena. They remain 
non-public cases, or lobbies, which can nonetheless be successful in pursuing targets to 
undertake action in order to remediate a violation. The decision to go public depends on 
the organisation behind the call. Some organisations do not want public attention for their 
case, for example, when they perceive it as too risky for political reasons, or fear that this 
will result in a ‘cut and run’ move by the company involved. In other situations, bringing 
a case to the attention of a CSR department and giving them the time to address the issues 
at stake might be sufficient. However, if these types of persuasive strategies fail, more 
compelling forms of action, such as naming and shaming, mobilising consumers through 
e-actions and organising picket-lines or demonstrations, are sometimes necessary. 
Because many companies are vulnerable to the reputational damage that is inflicted by an 
anti-sweatshop campaign, these strategies seek to change the ‘cost calculus of targets’.66 
This pressure might provide the necessary leverage that Southern groups apply to factory 
management.  
In 1998 and 1999, the CCC International Secretariat was handling an average of some 13 
cases per year. Between 2000 and 2005, the annual average rose to approximately 30 
cases per year, with the exception of 2004, when the CCC took up 47 cases (see table 1).  
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Table 1. Overview Urgent Appeals 2000-2005 
Country No. of 
cases in 
2000 
No. of 
cases in 
2001 
No. of 
cases in 
2002 
No. of 
cases in 
2003 
No. of 
cases in 
2004 
No. of 
cases in 
2005 
Total no. of 
cases 2000-
2005 
American Samoa  1     1 
Australia    1   1 
Bangladesh 2 4 4 3 4 5 22 
Burma 1      1 
Cambodia 4 3 3  4 3 17 
Canada     1  1 
China  1   2 1 4 
El Salvador    1   1 
Guatemala  1    1 2 
Haiti      2  2 
Honduras 2    1  3 
Hong Kong    1   1 
India 1  3 1 6 1 12 
Indonesia 4 4 10 7 9 8 42 
Kenya    1   1 
Lesotho  1 2 1   4 
Madagascar      1 1 
Malaysia       1 
Morocco  1   1  2 
Mexico  1 1 1 1 1 4 
Namibia      1  1 
Nicaragua 2      2 
Pakistan   1 1 1  3 
Philippines 1 3  5 2  11 
Spain   1    1 
Sri Lanka 1 1 1 1 4 3 11 
Swaziland      1 1 
Taiwan 1    1  1 
Thailand 4 2 3 5 4 1 19 
Tunisia      1 1 
Turkey     1 1 2 
United States   1  3 1 4 
Unknown     1*  1 
Former 
Yugoslavian 
Republic of 
Macedonia 
     1 1 
Zimbabwe 1      1 
Total 23 23 30 31 47 30  
Source: CCC data base. 
* Request to support the UN Norms – UN Human Rights Norms for business; there is currently growing opposition to 
the norms by Amnesty International and other organisations in several countries.  
Note. This is the number of appeals the CCC received. In (roughly) about one-third of the cases no further action 
(public or non-public/lobby) activity was undertaken, either at the request of the applicant or due to a lack of 
sufficient information which would have made it difficult to take up the case.                   
 
 
Approaching companies 
Over the last 10 years, hundreds of companies have been approached with the request to 
remediate a workers’ rights violation. Solidarity action in these specific cases consists of 
sending letters to retailers or brands sourcing from the factory concerned, urging them to 
use their material leverage, i.e., their purchasing power, on the supplier to respect 
workers’ rights. This often results leads to intense communications with companies and 
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their (emerging) CSR departments. While newly targeted brands and retailers at first still 
tend to deny responsibility for conditions in their supplier factories (or deny that they are 
producing in the factory in question), companies previously targeted by the CCC, or by 
similar anti-sweatshop campaigns elsewhere, have developed a more pro-active approach 
towards investigating alleged rights violations. The responses of laggard companies often 
impede the problem-solving capacity of the more interventionist companies. Note, for 
example, that the Spectrum factory collapse in Savar, Bangladesh in 2005 included 27 
sourcing companies. Some well-known brands like Nike, Adidas, the Gap or H&M are 
approached relatively often with appeals. This is not only because these companies 
command larger market shares, but also ‘because they have been successfully targeted in 
past appeals […and] the fact that some brands are more easily recognisable or easier to 
trace than others’.  
The involvement herein of MSIs plays an increasingly important role in taking up and co-
ordinating cases. They provide a platform through which sourcing companies may more 
easily be convinced to collaborate on remediation efforts, which is a benefit compared to 
corporations that are not members of an MSI and often lack a willingness to co-operate 
with other corporations on worker rights issues. At the same time, the involvement of 
MSI can also make cases more complex by adding yet another layer of organisations in 
the process of resolving an issue, which increases ‘particularly often when there is no 
agreement on what the problem is or no acceptance of responsibility for the problem by 
factory management or the brand/retailer’.67  
Box 3. Factors likely to have contributed to the success of the appeal 
A CCC impact assessment study concludes that the following factors are likely to have 
contributed to the success of the appeal. 
• workers are well organised, usually as unions (either at the factory level or beyond), with the 
majority supporting the issue the campaign focuses on. Union is strong enough to withstand 
the intense pressure generated by an international campaign; 
• a strong campaign exists at the national level in the country where the violation has occurred; 
• a good working relationship based on trust has been established between unions/other 
supporting organisations in producer countries and campaigning organisations supporting 
them internationally; 
• reliable, frequent, and clear channels of communication exist between everyone involved in 
the campaign; 
• clear co-ordination exists among the campaigning organisations involved, particularly on 
questions of strategy, information gathering and updates; 
• a person, organisation or MSI is responsible for mediation/facilitation in the country 
producing the garments. This role is often vital for information flow; 
• multiple pressure points are targeted internationally (for example: employer, agent, 
manufacturing TNC, brand or retailer, public authorities) in support of workers’ demands; 
• both the international solidarity campaign and the campaign in the producer country 
encompass a variety of tactics, tools and actions (including use of the media and creative 
actions) directed at multiple pressure points; 
• wherever web-based campaigns are used as a tool, regular updates are posted to motivate 
supporters, including any movement towards a resolution. The easier it is to send a protest 
letter electronically, the more likely people will do it; 
• a relationship has been established previously with the brand/retailer targeted. At least some 
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of the brands sourcing from the factory concerned have a code of conduct. If possible, the 
brands targeted are those with the highest percentage of production in the factory and, of 
course, those who are less likely to cut and run; 
• where legal decisions or recommendations have been taken by respected authorities in favour 
of the workers, these are used to further workers’ demands. While not essential, these can be 
useful as extra leverage to pressure companies to contribute to the resolution of  the dispute; 
• the campaign is sustained, usually over a long period of time. 
 
Source: Dent 2005.  
 
How successful are urgent appeals?  
A successful campaign around an urgent appeal would mean that workers demands were 
met, or, at least, partly met. It is often not easy to assess these campaigns in terms of 
successful or unsuccessful. For example, even if campaigns are lost, or partly lost, the 
participants have often gained ‘self-confidence, respect and dignity’.68 For example, 
during the Ladybird struggle of 2001, Wassana Lakhampha, a Ladybird employee and the 
union’s education officer was reported as saying: ‘We didn’t get all of our demands, but 
we had a good struggle. Our victory was our struggle.’69 Thus, it is also important to 
analyse what the workers or campaign organisations have learned from the case. 
Moreover, a union might be defeated in the short-term, but draw important lessons from 
this defeat and emerge to try again. Likewise, corporations or governments, might at first 
stick to their guns, but eventually they may change.  
At the same time, even if a transnational campaign helps local workers to establish a 
trade union, this success may not last long. Worker victories may not be sustained over 
time, which was the case with the Gina Bra Factory (Thailand) and the BJ&B garment 
factory (Dominican Republic). In both cases, local trade unions struggled long and hard 
to gain recognition and were supported by large transnational campaigns. But a few years 
after they won their struggle, the factory closed down. Asian TNCs played a key role in 
both cases. Keeping these remarks in mind, it is clear that it remains difficult, if not 
impossible, to determine to what extent change that has occurred – whether it be positive 
or negative – can be attributed to the CCC’s urgent appeal efforts (see box 3.).  
To summarise, the urgent appeal system has been essential for the CCC in building up a 
global and diverse network of labour groups and keeping corporations accountable. The 
urgent appeal system makes it possible:  
• to create a space for workers’ concerns to be heard beyond the local or national 
level;  
• to build solidarity with and amongst workers in producer countries;   
• to strengthen workers’ influence over the manufacturer by strategically using 
brand leverage; 
• to spread information on working conditions and struggles to a wider audience; 
• to raise consumer awareness on substandard labour conditions on concrete cases;   
• to involve consumers in ways that can contribute to workplace improvements;  
• to keep sourcing companies accountable for substandard working conditions 
throughout their supply chains;   
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• to highlight the gap between the sourcing company’s ethical commitments as 
expressed in codes of conduct or MSI participation and actual implementation, 
and;   
• to learn what problems workers face in workplaces and then use this as an input 
into improving code implementation systems and policy at company or multi-
stakeholder level; and,  
• to influence local, governments, government agencies and supporting struggles 
for legal change.  
2.3  Global campaigns  
A third key area of CCC activities has been centred on organising large-scale public 
campaigns. We can distinguish here between national campaigns and global campaigns. 
National campaigns refer to the various campaigning activities the different CCCs plan, 
execute and evaluate within their own country/alliance. Among other things, this 
typically includes targeting a particular set of companies such as national market leaders 
and popular brands headquartered in this country; raising consumer awareness through 
(symbolic) action; organising speaker tours with workers from production countries; 
putting a particular worker rights issue in the spotlight like forced labour, gender 
discrimination or the right to organise, for example; and lobbying governments to 
regulate corporations and enforce the labour standards to which they have committed 
themselves via international conventions. These campaigns often include a transnational 
component, for example, when the targeted company has a strong market presence in 
several countries. Global campaigns are developed on a cross-border basis. Unlike 
campaigns concerning urgent appeals, these campaigns are planned long in advance, and 
raise awareness on certain topics and apply pressure to facilitate general (policy) changes. 
These campaigns may last several years and attract world-wide participation. They 
provide an opportunity to expand the CCC’s network and to co-operate with other global 
networks and organisations.  
a. Sportswear campaigns 
Since the mid-1990s, the CCC has organised or participated in sportswear campaigns that 
focus on international sports events as a way of generating public attention. The 
promotional visibility of sportswear brands at these sporting events has had a reflexive 
effect by making these companies vulnerable to criticism from various societal actors, 
sometimes referred to as the ‘brand boomerang’.70 Campaigning around large sporting 
events like the Olympics thus provides an opportunity for cross-border and cross-
movement alliances to alter the cost calculus of sportswear companies, which become 
concerned that sweatshop allegations might undermine their brand image. It also provides 
an opportunity to involve new groups in activities, like supporters organisations, youth 
groups, etc. It is therefore no coincidence that since 1998, every large sporting event (the 
Olympic Games as well as both the World Cup and European Cup in soccer) has been 
used by labour advocates to draw attention to working conditions in the sportswear 
industry. The high profile character of the sporting events such as the Olympic Games 
provides opportunities for leverage and activist accomplishments in the sportswear 
industry. These campaigns are not solely concerned with addressing specific sportswear 
companies but have also sought to stimulate support for labour rights like a living wage 
and freedom of association and to bring these labour rights issues to the public’s 
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attention. The CCC campaign during the World Soccer Championships (World Cup) in 
France (1998), pursued several major issues such as the adoption of codes of conduct and 
monitoring and verification among the sportswear companies, the retailers and the 
football associations. This has remained a focus for all of the CCC’s campaign efforts 
since then. Moreover, the demand for a living wage was the major theme for the CCC’s 
campaign on during the 2000 European Soccer Championships (European Cup). In 2002, 
freedom of association was added to the living wage issue as an important demand for 
companies and sports associations.  
In 2004, the Play Fair at the Olympics Campaign continued this focus on freedom of 
association, and also added the issue of addressing purchasing practices. This campaign is 
considered an example of how international co-operation between NGOs and trade 
unions is taken to a higher level. The Play Fair Alliance brings together three large 
international networks of labour rights advocates – the Clean Clothes Campaign (CCC), 
Oxfam and global unions – that work together to affect social change in the sportswear 
sector. In the six-month run-up to the Athens Olympic Games (March 2004-August 
2004), the campaign organisers estimated that there had been some 500 local events (i.e., 
demonstrations, protest actions, picket lines, etc.) in 35 countries, with strong 
participation from (Southern) civil society organisations.71 This contributed to extensive 
coverage on television, radio, and in the print media. Moreover, more than 500,000 
people signed a petition in support of the campaign. In the run up to the Beijing 
Olympics, the Play Fair 2008 campaign continues ‘to push sportswear and athletic 
footwear companies, the International Olympics Committee (IOC) and its national 
organising committees (NOCs), as well as national governments, into taking identifiable 
and concrete measures to eliminate the exploitation and abuse of those mostly women 
workers in the global sporting goods industry.’72 In section 3.3, we will see how the Play 
Fair Alliance urged ‘sportswear companies and the International Olympic Committee 
(IOC) to bring about an industry-wide solution to the abuse and exploitation of workers in 
global sportswear supply chains’.73  
b. Giant retailers campaign 
In the next few years, the CCC will increasingly focus on multiple-product retailers (such 
as Carrefour, Aldi, Lidl and Wal-Mart) that increasingly dominate global markets. These 
companies pursue a business model that drives down prices throughout the supply chain, 
which has a negative impact on the capacity of developing country suppliers to pay 
decent wages and meet the cost of code compliance. In addition, these companies 
continue to lag behind in developing ethical policies compared to specialised retailers 
(such as the GAP or H&M) and sportswear brands (like Nike or Adidas). This is in part 
because they have not been the subject of anti-sweatshop campaigns as much as others. 
The fact that these companies sell multiple products and typically operate in non-
branded, low-cost segments of the market also presents a challenge for the development 
of campaign strategies. The ‘Giant Retailers’ campaign will try to make the role and 
dominance of these multiple-product retailers visible and emphasise the need to address 
the ‘business model’ itself. Via educational materials, consumer campaigns, critical 
research and a dialogue with the industry, the proposed programme will highlight this 
dynamic in order to facilitate change.  
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3. Comprehensive counter-strategies 
Let us now pose the question of what has actually been achieved thus far? Have the 
campaigns been effective in improving working conditions or supportive in workers 
attempts to organise? On the positive side, the activities that focused on corporate 
accountability have contributed to widespread attention and a growing awareness of 
sweatshop problems in the global economy. Millions of consumers have been reached 
through anti-sweatshop campaigns over the years. Many of them have actively 
participated in these campaigns by putting pressure on brands and retailers turning 
consumer power into a ‘resource and an opportunity for pro-worker struggles’.74 Activist 
attention that focuses on poor working conditions potentially jeopardises the core 
marketing strategies of these branded companies. It has turned brands into sites of 
political, cultural and ideological struggle. The campaigns and lobbies around urgent 
appeals has not only resulted in a number of workers’ victories but has also provided 
information to the CCC regarding the specific problems and barriers workers face at 
workplaces around the world. This, in turn, has reinforced the CCC’s efforts regarding 
corporate accountability. Furthermore, the urgent appeals system has reinforced the 
capacity for worker organisations and NGOs to work on cases on a cross-border level.  
Moreover, a growing group of corporations have now publicly endorsed ethical 
standards, including the core ILO conventions. Even though, as Appelbaum and 
Lichtenstein soberly argue: ‘The real value of these corporate codes of conduct, even at 
the best companies, lies in the realm of ideology. They legitimise the idea of a world-
wide social standard, even as their chronic failures demonstrate [highlighted by urgent 
appeals, for example] that any real transformation of the global supply chains must come 
from other sources’.75  
Some studies and observers indicate that monitoring the activities of sourcing companies 
has resulted in increased compliance with outcome standards such as health and safety 
and the length of a workday, as Stephanie Barrientos and Sally Smith point out.76 At the 
same time, they note that very little progress has been made with regard to process rights 
– freedom of association and collective bargaining – which would empower workers to 
struggle for changes in production systems themselves.77 A comprehensive study of 
factory audit results from over 800 Nike supply factories in 31 countries over seven 
years, concluded that ‘despite substantial efforts and investments by Nike and its staff to 
improve working conditions among its suppliers, monitoring alone appears to have 
produced only limited results’.78 Moreover, limited progress, if any, has been made to 
reverse the flexibilisation of labour or to strengthen or reform national labour laws. 
Labour rights advocates agree that progress with voluntary initiatives is limited since it 
has not succeeded in persuading governments to create legislated regulatory regimes that 
ensure that workers’ rights, particularly their right to freedom of association, are 
respected.79 Furthermore, despite many living wage campaigns, wages have not improved 
in the garment industry and, as Peter Utting from the UNRISD argues, ‘[p]erhaps the 
weakest aspect of both CSR discourse and practice relates to redistribution’.80  
In other words, despite progress in some areas, we can conclude that the systemic 
problems driving substandard working conditions have yet not been successfully 
addressed.81 What strategies would support substantive change and empower workers at 
the point of production? What strategy would help provide a legal protective framework? 
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What strategy would limit the structural power of capital – at least with regard to 
relocation decisions – and deal first with issues related to redistribution to guarantee that 
wages meet basic needs?82 Many of the causes behind the structural crisis of labour 
flexibility are systemic and cannot be solved unilaterally by companies and require a 
collective or sector-wide response instead. There is no magic formula or ready-made 
political recipe to come up with the right strategy; it is only through the experiences 
accumulated through political praxis (a cumulative process of action, response, 
deliberation, solidarity, struggle, conceptualisation and evaluation) that will allow the 
global anti-sweatshop movement to 
seek solutions to this crisis. The next 
section will discuss three 
comprehensive counter-strategies, 
proposed and/or supported by the 
CCC, which might help to intensify 
regulatory efforts in the next decade 
of global anti-sweatshop 
campaigning.83 
3.1. Local campaigns 
In section 2.2, we saw that urgent appeal work is important in the support of workers’ 
struggles and the building of cross-border solidarity networks. However, a disadvantage 
is that a case-by-case approach is slow, and time- and resource demanding. It would be 
difficult for the CCC and other organisations, which employ similar methods, to increase 
the annual number of urgent appeals they handle. Likewise, even if a pro-active CSR 
department of a global brand was able to detect violations on these issues, it is often very 
difficult (if not impossible) to address these issues on an individual basis. For these 
reasons, the CCC has increasingly begun focussing on core themes in urgent appeal work 
and addressed these as a series of collective cases with brands, retailers and possibly 
governments. Many of the conflicts or violations that occur in a particular production 
area are part of a more general pattern. These thematic campaigns are rooted in a specific 
geographic area, and executed in direct collaboration with local agents who define 
priorities, goals and targets.  
A good example of thematic campaigning, before the idea as such was articulated, is 
provided by the urgent appeal cases in Sri Lanka. In 2001, an appeal from the Free Trade 
Zone and General Services Employees Union (FTZ&GSEU) and Transnationals 
Information Exchange-Asia (TIE-Asia) requested to send protest letters targeting the 
repression of union organising at 10 different factories operating in the free trade zones 
and producing for Nike, among others, of which six cases involved dismissal following 
the formation of a union. The campaign for workers’ freedom of association in free trade 
zones went on for six months. International pressure from the campaign groups and trade 
unions helped to convince the Board of Investment (BOI) to budge on the position of 
refusing to recognise unions in the Free Trade Zones (1994-2003) to the theoretical 
recognition of unions in its 2003/2004 guidelines. At an ILO-sponsored tripartite 
meeting, Sri Lanka’s Board of Investment agreed to write to all factories under its 
administration to inform them that ILO Conventions number 87 and 98 must be 
implemented. As a consequence, Sri Lanka’s media began covering the emergence of the 
Figure 2.  
Local  
campaigns 
Regional 
campaigns
Sector-wide 
campaigns 
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democratic trade union movement.84 Similar campaigns in Thailand have also been met 
with success; the Thai government agreed to set up a workers compensation fund to when 
factories close down.85   
Developing thematic campaigns 
Developing thematic campaigns on numerous workplaces simultaneously might help to 
generate multiple effects in the affected zone, sector or country in at least three different 
ways.  
• First, cross-border campaigns could support local organisations in their efforts to 
reform and strengthen national laws. Campaign pressure could be directed at brands 
and retailers to support the strengthening of laws. The potential negative effects from 
TNCs that influence government policies are well documented and understood in the 
network, and any strategies in this area need to be very carefully formulated and 
planned. In 2006, at a large strategy meeting between Asian worker organisations, 
campaign groups and the CCC reached a consensus was that brands and retailers can 
be requested to express their support for the demands formulated in campaigns 
initiated and led by the local groups themselves – but should generally be 
discouraged from intervening on their own account in the labour laws of a country. 
For example, when, in 2005, trade union partners in Bangladesh reported to the CCC 
that the government of Bangladesh was planning to extend the working week to 72(!) 
hours to attract investment, the CCC and network partners called upon brands, 
retailers and MSIs to express their concerns on the record, in writing, and state that 
this would contravene their ethical policies. As a result, the plan was abandoned. 
• Second, thematic campaigns could stimulate direct engagement between Southern 
groups and brand and retailer (local) compliance staff. This would represent a move 
away from the managerial, top-down approaches still advocated by the majority of 
global sourcing corporations and might be helpful in bringing CSR programs (more) 
into line with local priorities, debates and strategies. For example, through enhanced 
transparency on findings of workplace investigations and direct worker participation 
in drawing up corrective action plans. 
• Third, thematic campaigns could bring concerns raised by local women’s groups and 
other organisations in production countries to the foreground, for example on issues 
concerning employment security or gender discrimination. These are very urgent 
issues to certain stakeholders (women workers, informalised workers) but are not 
easily detected through mainstream code monitoring (see ETI impact assessment). At 
the same time, the CCC’s urgent appeal system is triggered by workers who have 
some capacity for organising around issues that are specific to the nearly invisible 
(informalised) women workers. Thematic campaigns could help shed light on 
working conditions beyond the first tier of suppliers and lead to the formulation of 
strategies to deal with precarious forms of employment and the casualisation of 
labour.  
 
 
 29
3.2. Regional campaigns 
Local strategies are necessary to address specific barriers that impede decent working 
conditions and also oppress workers. However, as we have seen, local approaches are 
easily undermined by the relocation strategies of capital. ‘Should one group of worker 
win an advance in this system of globalised capital, their gains may be subverted as the 
employer moves the job to the cheaper or more docile labour force’.86 This same dynamic 
prevents governments from implementing stronger labour laws or increasing minimum 
wages. As long as the different spatial areas are pitted against each other in a competitive 
race to lower labour costs, chronic instability and poor working conditions will continue 
to dominate. Even if employers recognise the right to freedom of association and 
collective bargaining through codes of conduct or other instruments, this will not be 
sufficient because organising, in itself does not necessarily lead to bargaining power. 
Workers have attempted to organise over the years in numerous, courageous ways. 
However, workers who have developed their bargaining abilities in a certain factory and 
demanded higher wages, and have done so by threatening to close and move jobs 
elsewhere where wages are lower.87  
To see any systematic progress it is therefore necessary to develop cross-border strategies 
to confront the capital mobility pursued by sourcing companies and Asian TNCs. This 
must be combined with strategies that simultaneously pursue income distribution between 
capital and labour through higher wages and a shift in income distribution between 
sourcing companies and suppliers through higher freight on board (FOB) prices.  
The Asian Floor Wage Campaign 
One such strategy has been proposed by the Asian Floor Wage (AFW) campaign for the 
garment industry, an alliance of 34 trade unions and labour NGOs in 14 Asian countries 
along with European and US labour advocates. The AFW strategy explicitly seeks to 
approach ‘the supply chain in its totality and locate the manufacturing activity within this 
total picture’. This alliance has developed a campaign proposal to put a floor on the race 
to the bottom and to prevent wage competition between Asian garment-exporting 
countries.  
Consolidation tendencies at three different levels might provide opportunities for worker 
organisation. First, there exists a regional consolidation of garment production in Asia, 
which accounts for about two-thirds of the total global trade of readymade garments. It is 
widely expected that the lifting of quota restrictions (the MFA phase-out) will result in a 
further consolidation in Asian countries. While relocations may occur between various 
Asian countries, Asia as a whole is unlikely to lose much business. Second, while 
production activities are fragmented among thousands and thousands of suppliers, here 
too a process of concentration of production is occurring, at least in certain segments of 
the garment industry.88 Large manufacturers, or Tier 1 companies, have emerged that 
often employ thousands of workers and have direct supply relations with major brands 
and retailers. Third, consolidation also includes sourcing companies so that ‘giant’ or ‘big 
box’ retail companies like Wal-Mart or Carrefour win market share as they increasingly 
assume functions formally executed by brand-named corporations.   
These consolidation tendencies in turn provide the objective conditions unique to the 
global garment industry that ‘can be used to leverage collective bargaining gains for both 
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capital and labour in this sector among Asian countries’.89 Four arguments are presented 
here: 
1. First, because the growing scale of production by Tier1 companies restricts the 
capacity for quick geographical relocation. These companies have made large 
investments not only in factories, warehouses and dormitories but also in acquiring 
specific knowledge on the recruitment labour and the establishment of relations with 
local authorities.90 This limits the possibilities for overnight closure when confronted 
with an organising effort.  
2. Second, since these manufacturers have specialised in a range of activities related to 
the production process – i.e., not just cut-make-trim but also in design, pattern-
making, quality-control activities etc. – that labour cost as a percentage of garment 
price is relatively low. Increasing wages may actually not have such a dramatic 
impact on the manufacturers’ bottom line.91  
3. Third, large orders, strict time schedules and high penalties for late completion or not 
supplying contracted item makes them vulnerable to production disruptions. 
Industrial actions focused on this aspect may be effective in pressuring 
manufacturers.  
4. Finally, because of their close (direct) relations with branded companies and retailers, 
Tier1 companies are more vulnerable to buyer pressures on labour standards, which 
can further aid the process of collectivisation and the forming of unions in these 
factories. 
With these considerations in mind, the AFW campaign has sought to unite Asian workers 
by employing a strategy that would raise wages for all of the workers. The campaigners 
believe that this consolidation ‘can be used to leverage collective bargaining gains for 
both capital and labour in this sector among Asian countries’.92 While relocation may 
occur between Asian countries, Asia as a whole is unlikely to lose much business. It is 
also important to keep in mind that differences in wage levels between the major Asian 
garment-exporting countries are relatively small, with wages ranging between US$1.5 
and US$2.5 a day, with an average of US$2. As has been widely documented, this wage 
level falls short of what is required to adequately support a worker and her family, and 
the AFW alliance is campaigning for double this figure, which will be translated into 
various currencies across countries via the purchasing power parity (PPP) system.93 This 
is linked to the issue of fair pricing by sourcing companies, which is an essential 
requirement to make a higher wage possible. Since, as mentioned earlier, wages represent 
only a small percentage of the retail price – somewhere between 0.5 and 1.5 percent – the 
alliance believes that the supply chain has the capacity to absorb such wage increases 
without too much difficulty.   
3.3. Sector-wide campaigns  
Finally, local and regional campaigns should be complemented with strategies that target 
business at the industry-wide level. Both thematic campaigns and regional campaigns can 
only be successful if a large group of companies in one way or another participates in a 
sector-wide approach. Many of the causes behind the structural crisis of labour flexibility 
are systemic and cannot be solved unilaterally by companies but require a collective or 
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sector-wide response. As Dwight Justice from the ITUC formulates it: ‘Companies 
cannot make an impact one-by-one. Unless the entire industry puts a joint effort into code 
compliance, worker’s lives are not going to change’.94 If, for example, a ‘Free Trade 
Zone authority maintains a blacklist of union sympathisers, pushing one supplier in the 
zone into refusing to participate in the maintenance of such a blacklist is not only very 
difficult but also nowhere near as effective as when several companies collectively 
buying in the zone would approach the authority and the suppliers collectively. 
[Likewise], the possibility of a price increase being translated into a higher wage for the 
workers will be severely diluted if only one buyer out of six will make the effort’.95 It is, 
therefore, often critical that sourcing companies in shared factories collaborate in order to 
achieve sustainable improvements. More generally, systemic change requires a combined 
effort on the part of the entire sector before they can begin to overcome the limits of the 
current code-implementation model. This requires persuading the whole industry to work 
together to address labour rights. For campaign groups, the challenge faced here is how to 
persuade multiple, and to various degrees, intransigent agents, operating in a highly 
pluralistic and decentralised context to participate in such an approach.  
 
A positive development is that the advantages of inter-firm co-operation are increasingly 
recognised by the (more experienced) CSR departments of some brands and retailers.96 
Doug Cahn, former-Vice President for Human Rights at Reebok, has noted that ‘we may 
be only 20% of a particular supplier’s business and thus have little influence, but when 
we can combine with two other companies that each have 20%, we can leverage our 
influence over that factory operator’.97 While Nike has argued that it does not have ‘the 
power to single-handedly solve the issues at stake’. Instead, progress ‘will only come 
through working with others in the industry through a variety of multi-stakeholder 
partnerships. And this is true for all areas of corporate responsibility, from compliance 
and environment to community investment programs’.98 These comments suggest that 
there might be ‘an interest among leading firms for a more level playing field vis-à-vis 
laggards, thereby realigning the political balance in the corporate sector’.99  
 
Moreover, it has been increasingly observed that the plethora of individual approaches is 
not only confusing and inefficient, but also time and resource consuming. The weight of 
multiple audits and monitoring programmes has begun convincing different organisations 
to promote the harmonisation of compliance models and/or the exchange of social audit 
information. Since 2003, five labour standards MSIs and the CCC100 have collaborated in 
the JO-IN project – which stands for Joint Initiative on Corporate Accountability and 
Workers’ Rights. Here a dialogue was initiated on how to achieve better co-ordination 
among the various multi-stakeholder initiatives, for example, by drafting a common code 
of conduct and carrying out a joint code monitoring and remediation project at a series of 
apparel factories in Turkey.101  
Business-led initiatives 
At the same time, this process of up-scaling the regulatory efforts remains framed by the 
various interests, agendas and political strategies involved. This is most clearly evident in 
business-controlled efforts to regain political control over the code implementation and 
monitoring debate. Here, the Global Social Compliance Programme (GSCP), initiated by 
Tesco, Wal-Mart, Carrefour and Metro, represents the latest proposal by business to 
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address sweatshop conditions in the global supply chains of multinational corporations, 
but with an aggregate annual sale of over $500 billion, this initiative will potentially 
overshadow all of the others.102  
Business-led initiatives marginalise the input of stakeholders to an advisory board, which 
is basically ‘a hostage role without direct influence’.103 Setting up consulting 
arrangements with stakeholders through the establishment of an advisory board, with no 
powers whatsoever, would do little to address the legitimacy gap. There is, after all, a 
fundamental difference between being involved in an advisory capacity, or being 
consulted, and being co-responsible. The same critique applies for the Business Social 
Compliance Initiative (BSCI), which has attracted 91 European companies, many of them 
active in the garment sector, since its establishment in 2003.104  
As it stands now, the BSCI and GSCP should be clearly contrasted with various MSIs 
that are at least ‘attempting to build democratic, locally accountable, substantively 
responsive, participatory strategies of governance’.105 Instead, these initiatives provide 
‘laggard’ companies with a platform to escape participation in established multi-
stakeholder initiatives. These initiatives, as Egels-Zandén and Wahlqvist point out:  
can be seen as an attempt by firms to counterbalance the powerful actor-networks formed by 
unions and NGOs (such as the Clean Clothes Campaigns) by organising themselves into 
equally powerful actor-networks. By then leveraging the strength of these actors-networks, the 
firms are trying to renegotiate their responsibility as comprising, for example, codes of 
conduct rather than global agreement, ‘minimum’ rather than ‘living’ wages, external … 
auditing rather than NGO and/or union auditors …106 
The danger is that these initiatives will increase public and consumer confusion and 
undermine the credibility of non-governmental programmes to improve working 
conditions. In addition, their existence complicates and ultimately has an impact on the 
campaign strategies as laggard companies increasingly use the cover of a common 
initiative to defend themselves against sweatshop allegations.107   
Campaigning for a sector-wide approach 
During the Play Fair campaign in 2004, in an attempt to steer the sportswear industry a 
comprehensive work programme was proposed for the sportswear industry. During this 
campaign, the alliance spotlighted seven sportswear companies – Asics, Fila, Kappa, 
Lotto, Mizuno, Puma, and Umbro –in an effort to force them to address issues of 
widespread exploitation and the abuse of workers in their supply chains. At the same 
time, the Play Fair Alliance urged ‘sportswear companies and the International Olympic 
Committee (IOC) to bring about an industry-wide solution to the abuse and exploitation 
of workers in global sportswear supply chains’.108  
At the company level, a set of recommendations urged sportswear companies to develop 
and implement a credible labour-practice policy, whereby suppliers and their sub-
contractors respect internationally recognised labour standards’.109 With this 
recommendation, the Play Fair Alliance seeks to convince individual companies to invest 
in – what today constitutes– ‘best practice’ in labour standards and implementation 
programmes (see figure 2). The second set of recommendations focussed on getting the 
key players in the sportswear industry to work together at the sectoral level and to carry 
out, in co-operation with appropriate trade unions and NGOs, a comprehensive, far-
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reaching programme for improvements in the sector. Companies were encouraged to join 
the efforts of trade unions and other concerned organisations in an agenda that promotes 
the rights of workers to join and form trade unions, which supersedes the limits of the 
current compliance model, and ensures an ongoing dialogue between the main companies 
in the sector. In particular, the alliance proposed a sectoral framework agreement 
between the International Textile, Garment and Leather Workers Federation’ and the 
World Federation of Sporting Goods Industries (WFSGI).110 On a company level, the 
Play Fair campaign was successful in pressuring Asics, Mizuno, Puma and Umbro to 
increase their efforts to improve working conditions throughout their supply chains.111 
Furthermore, the public disclosure of factory locations by a growing number of 
sportswear brands, including Nike, Adidas and Puma, ‘represents an invitation to trade 
unions and labour rights NGOs to bring workplace problems to the attention of brands 
and to collaborate with them on remediation. In a series of national meetings in the 
Philippines, Thailand, Indonesia and Malaysia, the above brands and a number of their 
key in country suppliers engaged with ITGLWF affiliates in a dialogue on the 
implementation of freedom of association and collective bargaining’.112 
 
 
However, the proposals were less successful at the industry-wide level. While the 
dialogue between the Play Fair Alliance and the WFSGI commenced with these 
proposals, it became clear early on that this body: ‘has in fact no authority, that its lead 
members have ducked their responsibility for this sector as a whole, preferring to hide 
behind their respective CSR programmes…’.113 The prospects for negotiating and 
implementing a (formal) sector-wide agreement thus remain rather remote. Nevertheless, 
the work programme indicates that the anti-sweatshop movement continues to search for 
long-term systemic solutions even if it has to employ a campaign logic to steer laggard 
brands in this direction. The question of how to move to a sector-wide approach will 
continue to play an important role in future campaigns. The Play Fair 2008 campaign has 
Twin-track  
approach 
(i) Individual company approach 
- Align their codes and compliance programmes with best practice in the sector 
- The designation of appropriate managerial expertise to CSR  
- The creation of industrial relations procedures for handling grievances and disputes
- The mapping of supply chains 
- The use of credible local organizations to assist in workplace investigations 
- The provision of training on worker rights 
- The development of greater transparency measures on code implementation 
- The development of standards on purchasing practices
(ii) Industry-wide approach 
- Sectoral framework agreement 
- International Social Dialogue with relevant 
stakeholders 
Figure 2. Strategy of the Play Fair Campaign  
Source: From Athens to Beijing — a Programme of Work for the Sportswear Industry, 
http://www.cleanclothes.org/campaign/olympics2004-07-08.htm.
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developed this strategy further and has urged sportswear companies ‘to take a series of 
concrete, measurable actions in close collaboration with multi-stakeholder initiatives, 
trade unions, non-governmental organisations, and governments’.114 
Conclusion 
In response to being exposed to anti-sweatshop campaigns that attack their substandard 
working conditions, as the feel-good logos are turned into signs associated with the 
extremes of exploitation, many corporations have taken some steps to address these 
situations. This dynamic has resulted in a wide variety of mainly non-state forms of 
labour regulation such as codes of conduct, ethical labels, multi-stakeholder initiatives 
supposedly established to mitigate the destructive effects of an unfettered market 
economy.  There are currently hundreds of ethical codes that have been adopted and that 
CSR has turned into a ‘routine management function’ in the textiles, clothing footwear 
and other industries.115 Yet, as we saw, the overall influence of the anti-sweatshop 
movement (or the CCC) must clearly not be overstated.  
Global production practices in many places of the developing world continue to 
deteriorate while governments continue to fail to enact or enforce labour laws. The 
redirection of orders towards countries that outlaw or restrict freedom of association 
further reinforces the exclusion or marginalisation of workers and their organisations 
from the mechanisms set up to implement, monitor or verify code compliance. Moreover, 
falling prices at the centres of consumption keeps the pressure on to reduce the cost of 
production and to keep wages at a minimum. The constant threat of relocation makes it 
difficult to design successful counter-strategies at a national level. The regulatory vacuum 
created by the shift from nationally-oriented production systems to globally organised 
production networks lies at the heart of this crisis. This vacuum needs to be filled in order 
to address the root causes of the structural crisis of labour flexibility.  
The second part of this paper described the main strategies employed by the CCC over 
the past 10 years. This provided the context for the final section of the paper, in which we 
discussed three strategies that seek to increase the campaigning efforts. First, we 
discussed attempts to develop so-called strategic campaigns on multiple but 
geographically clustered workplaces. These campaigns target a specific problem that 
code compliance programmes typically fail to deal with on an individual basis. This 
includes grouping several factory closures and raising common demands on, for example, 
legal changes, severance payments or dealing with wage demands. Second, the proposal 
for an Asian Floor Wage Campaign represents an attempt to denationalise wage 
bargaining and opt for region-wide organising by which it seeks to address capital’s 
strategy of pitting workers against workers, countries against countries. Third, and 
finally, the Play Fair Alliance attempts to turn an entire sector into an object of regulatory 
action, beyond any one individual company or a particular country. Such campaigns 
should be understood as trial-and-error searches for new ways to build regulatory 
institutions at a level that not only matches the scale of today’s productive operations but 
also re-establishes labour as a representative force within it. After all, it is only through 
concrete political projects that the Clean Clothes Campaign network and its partners can 
hope to achieve its objective of improving working conditions in the global garment 
industry.  
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